Coalition Politics in India: History and Analysis of Political Alliances

Manoj Kumar, BSF, Researcher CPCS, Jaipur.

Abstract: *Federalism is an instrument of power sharing between independent authorities' viz. union and state. Coalition government is also a means of power sharing. Logically both federalism and coalition government should be complimentary to each other. As the object of sharing of power is common in both, a student of politics or law may gather the impression that coalition government is always supportive of federal form of government or constitution and sometime also gives more opportunity for expression of ideas and democratic rights to small and regional parties. In this way it seems that coalition government promotes democracy and representative administration. But there are some grey areas also of the coalition politics like sometimes the coalition which are formed after declaration of election which give rise to 'horse trading' for the purpose of proving majority on the floor of house of representatives. The paper discusses the development of coalition politics and explores some solutions how the grey areas in coalition politics can be minimized.*

Keywords: Alliance, Elections, Democracy, Corruption, Stability, Government, Representation

The trend of coalition politics can be traced back to right from the history of parliamentary democracy in India. As far as definition is concerned there is difference between coalition politics and political alliance. 'A political alliance, also referred to as a political coalition, political bloc, is an agreement for cooperation between different political parties on common political agenda, often for purposes of contesting an election to mutually benefit by collectively clearing election thresholds, or otherwise benefiting from characteristics of the voting system or for government formation after elections'. [1]

'A coalition government is formed when a political alliance comes to power, or when only a plurality (not a majority) has not been reached and several parties must work together to govern. One of the peculiarities of such a method of governance results in Minister of State without Portfolio'. [2]

The early legacy

By 1947, it was clear that the Congress would inherit power from the British in most, though not all parts of India. One of its historic strengths was its ability to reinvent itself and absorb new currents of thought and significant blocs of the populace into its fold. 'Even in 1946, it had key

allies in two Muslim dominated regions, the North West Frontier Province and in the princely state of Kashmir. It had also shared power, in an uneasy arrangement with the Muslim League from 1946 onwards. But the programmatic adherence of the Congress to a strong Centre with residuary powers vested in it was a major stumbling block in talks. This was a key element of the Nehru Report of 1928, which also called for universal franchise. Despite many changes, both goals were to be realised in the new post-1947 political order, and more so, with the promulgation of the Constitution of 1950'. [3] A third feature, often overlooked was the commitment under the Poona Pact of 1931 to reserve seats in the legislature for historically disadvantaged sections, the Scheduled Castes and Tribes. Unlike the Muslim League, BR Ambedkar gave up the demand for a separate electorate. Seats were reserved with the voters forming a unified body. Such measures enabled the Congress to recover rapidly among Dalit voters who then stayed loyal to it for decades. The emphasis on pluralism enabled similar success among minority voters.

 The flexible nature of the Congress, always more of an umbrella party than a rigid or doctrinaire organisation, was critical to giving India a modicum of political stability in its early years after independence. In fact, its doors remained open for many of its critics through the Nehru period. The early Nehru government though assured of a majority had in its ranks well known critics of his party like Ambedkar, SP Mukherjee and experts like Dr John Mathai and CD Deshmukh. The expansion of franchise to all adults in 1952, was soon followed by the cession of the demand for the re-organisation of states on a linguistic basis. The Congress was able to cede such demands without in any way reducing its own political base. In much of southern and western India, the expansion of franchise built on decades of social reform movements. New leaders like Kamaraj in Tamil Nadu and YB Chavan in Maharashtra ascended to power but gave popular aspirations their due place in governance. 'The induction of the Backward Classes or the peasant masses into the power structure as accomplished without major social upheaval. The Congress was for long both a party of power and the logical place for many who disagreed with policies of the government. Thus contrary views were expressed in party forums: for and against more resources for agriculture, pro and anti-reservation, favouring or opposing the dominance of government over the party'. [4]

 The structure of coalition/post election alliances had its weaknesses, which can only be touched upon because they subject to the future of Indian democracy. 'The party often saw itself as the guardian of the nation, and the use of Article 356 to dismiss state governments was tried out, most famously against the Communist ministry in Kerala. [5] Further, the party soon became a wing of the state apparatus, a development that reached its apogee in the Indira period (1966-77; 1980-84). The opposition responded by forming broad alliances to pool their votes. In 1967, the ruling party was ousted from power in 7 states; it split two years later'. [6]

"In 1967, a study, entitled "Comparative Study of Coalitions", was prepared by the Research and Policy Planning Division of the Union Home Ministry. It was prepared in the context of the Congress debacle in the fourth general elections in 1967. It noted that there were then as many as 24 political parties recognised by the Election Commission; eight as national or multi-State parties and 16 as regional parties. While the divergence between the votes polled and the seats won, which the electoral system brought about, had worked for the Congress in the past, in 1967 it went against it. If this trend continued, the study also observed, "it was clear that the greater

the extent to which the other parties combined, pooled their votes and presented as few candidates against the Congress as possible, the greater will be the loss of seats by the Congress in all constituencies where it held a marginal lead over the parties due to the scattering of the votes". [7]

 The study was unrealistically optimistic. "As parties increasingly aim at compatibility in entering into alliance, the ugly in-coalitional stresses and conflicts, mainly due to ideological and programmatic incompatibility of the partners witnessed after 1967, may prove to be a passing phase." [8] Few party bosses had the talents of S.K. Patil, for long the Bombay Congress' boss. He urged the Congress to give up its high and mighty attitude and take the lead in forging coalitions. [9] He advised the Congress in March 1969: "Now, it is obvious that the process of coalitions must start and coalitions must be formed not only after but also during and before the elections. If well-planned coalitions are formed before the election, they will develop a capacity of lasting longer and becoming more effective in actual functioning. Coalitions have become a political necessity in India today. It will take a long time, not less than 25 years, to develop a two-party system in India. …In many other democratic countries, two-party system has even now not made any demonstrative impact. In most of the European countries, which are democratic, coalitions are accepted as a matter of fact." [10] It is no coincidence that several of the parties that had combined against it at a state level came together to form the first ever non-Congress regime in New Delhi in 1977.

In fact, the pulls and pressures of Indian politics today can only be understood by tracing their roots to the post-1967 changes. Ousting Congress was easier than forging another political instrument of rule. In most of north India, the break up of the united Opposition governments came about due to difference of interest and ideology between the Jana Sangh and the socialists. The former had a stronger urban profile and the latter, a rural base, the former were stronger among the upper strata and the latter among the worse off sections and the middle peasantry. 'The collapse of the Morarji Desai (1977-79) ministry was due to similar rifts. A second significant feature was the ouster of the Congress from certain states as the party of power. This first took place in Tamil Nadu where a regional party came to power and then in West Bengal in 1977 where a Marxist-led coalition won office. Over time, a process of the steady displacement of Congress from the place of the natural party of government was at work'. [11]

 The internal fissures among opposition parties led them to give up attempts to merge after the 1979 collapse. But the rifts on issues and the clashes at the base found expression during the next non- Congress government of VP Singh (1989-90). But this time, the ideological polarisation was sharper. Reservation of seats in Union government posts for the Other Backward Classes, long a feature in southern and western India, sparked off strong adverse reactions among the upper castes especially in the Hindi belt. The announcement in August was followed by the October campaign of the BJP leader LK Advani to a disputed site in Ayodhya. Though neither the Mandal nor the Mandir cards worked in a narrow sense, in that it did not give the men who played them a key to hold on to or to attain power, they left a deep mark on the Indian polity. In fact, the Congress was reduced to the sidelines, and failed to win a majority in the 1991 elections. Both caste and community would now play a more explicit role in political

mobilisation than in the past, and the old party of consensus was caught between two stools. It implemented a diluted version of the OBC reservations, but the failure to protect the Babri Masjid contributed to the erosion of its image and eventually prevented it from staking a claim to power in 1996.

Prior to 2014, India witnessed seven consecutive elections (1989 to 2009) in which no single party won a majority of seats in the Lok Sabha, resulting in minority governments, including unwieldy minority coalitions, dependent on external support.

With the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) winning a majority in the 2014 election, and continuing the trend by seizing two states, Maharashtra and Haryana from the Congress in the October 2014 assembly elections, the question arises as to whether coalition politics is still important. To our mind, the answer is an unambiguous yes; pre-electoral coalitions were important for the BJP's majority in the Lok Sabha, a post-electoral coalition is necessary in Maharashtra, and alliance-building will be for the future in terms of passing legislation and expanding the party's reach.

The Analysis of Importance of Pre-Electoral Coalitions in 2014

 In contemporary Indian politics, the incentive for national parties to form pre-electoral coalitions is straightforward. Given India's first-past-the-post electoral system, the aggregation of votes at the constituency level is vital for winning seats. By implication, given the breakdown of the national party system into distinct state party systems, the formation of alliances with parties commanding a significant state-level vote share helps to aggregate constituency-level votes shares in states where one's own party is not strong enough to go it alone. Hence, pre-electoral coalitions have the potential of increasing the number of seats won although they come at the expense of conceding a certain number of seats to allies, and also including such allies in a post-election government.

The underlying principle is that a third party could leverage expected vote share in states where it is perceived to be a significant third party with a potentially "bridging vote share." In essence, perceived pivotality for electoral victory helps it to form electoral coalitions with the first or second parties in the states in which it is allocated more seats to contest than in the previous elections

The BJP, since 1989, has grown partly on the basis of its own ideological appeal and mobilization and partly by leveraging coalitions, while the Congress turned to coalitions with success in 2004 and 2009.

The general finding on pre-electoral coalitions is that the seat-sharing ratio between partners tends to get stuck in a narrow band, and does not adjust smoothly according to the demands of a partner who perceives its popularity to be on the upswing. For example, both the Congress-NCP and BJP-Shiv Sena coalitions in Maharashtra, the BJP-Janata Dal (United) (JD(U))coalition in Bihar (until recently) and the BJP-Akali Dal coalition in Punjab, as well as the Left Front coalitions in West Bengal and Kerala, and the Congress-led UDF coalition in Kerala all tended to remain stable in their seat-sharing ratios over the past two or more elections, with adjustments happening within a very narrow band. It is only when old coalitions break down due to one partner demanding a substantial revision of terms, as in Maharashtra in October 2014 for both

Congress-NCP and BJP-Shiv Sena coalitions, and new coalitions are formed that new ratios can be established.

Table 1: National Democratic Alliance 2014

State	Party	Seats Contesting	Seats Won	Vote Share
National	BJP	426	282	31%
Tamil Nadu	BJP	7	1	5.50%
	Desiya Murpokku Dravida Kazhagam	15	0	5.10%
	Pattali Makkal Katchi	8	1	4.40%
	Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam	7	0	3.50%
	Kongunadu Makkal Desia Katchi	1	0	
	Indhiya Jananayaga Katchi	1	0	
	New Justice Party	0	0	
Andhra Pradesh	BJP	13	3	8.50%
	TDP	30	16	29.10%
	Jana Sena Party	0	-	
Maharashtra	BJP	24	23	27.30%
	Shiv Sena	20	18	20.60%
	Swabhimani Paksha	2	1	2.30%
	Republican Party of India (A)	1	0	0.10%
	Rashtriya Samaj Paksha	1	0	0.90%
Bihar	BJP	30	22	29.40%
	Lok Janshakti Party	7	6	6.40%
	Rashtriya Lok Samta Party	4	3	3%
Punjab	BJP	3	1	8.70%
	Shiromani Akali Dal	10	4	20.30%
Haryana	BJP	8	7	34.70%
	Haryana Janhit Congress	2	0	6.10%
Uttar Pradesh	BJP	78	71	42.30%
	Apna Dal	2	2	1%
Kerala	BJP	18	0	10.30%
	Kerala Congress (Nationalist)	1	0	0.25%
	Revolutionary Socialist Party (B)	1	0	0.24%
Puducherry	All India N.R. Congress	1	1	34.60%
Meghalaya	BJP	1	1	8.90%
	National People's Party	1	1	22.20%
Nagaland	Naga People's Front	1	1	68.67%
Mizoram	United Democratic Front	1	0	47.17%
Manipur	Manipur People's Party	0	-	
North-East	North-East Regional Political Front	%	-	
West Bengal	BJP	42	2	16.80%
	Gorkha Janmukti Morcha	0	-	-
	Kamtapur People's Party	0	-	-
Goa	BJP	2	2	53.40%
	Maharashtrawadi Gomantak Party	0	-	
	Goa Vikas Party	0	-	

(%) NPP, NPF and MNF are contesting in each Seats & Other 8 Members supporting NDA Candidates
Source: Election Commission of India http://eciresults.nic.in/PartyWiseResult.htm

In 2014, the BJP struck a range of new alliances, most of them on more favorable terms than in the past while retaining its key old alliances (Shiv Sena, Akali Dal) on status quo terms. Thus, in

2014, the BJP forged pre-electoral alliances in ten states, compared to six alliances in 2009, in which both it and its partner(s) contested seats, of which seven were new alliances – Bihar, erstwhile Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Haryana, Kerala, Meghalaya and UP – and defined by more favorable terms.

While the BJP has won 282 seats, a majority of the 543 elected, in the Lok Sabha, it has formed a surplus majority NDA government with its pre-electoral coalition partners, taking the tally up to 334 seats. However, the question arises as to the stability of the BJP's majority in future elections and, by extension, the continuing relevance of coalitions.

Of the 282 seats won by the BJP, as many as 57 seats are accounted for by states in which the BJP depended significantly on coalition partners (not counting UP where the Apna Dal was a minor ally). These are Maharashtra (23 seats), Bihar (22), Haryana (7), Andhra Pradesh (2), Punjab (2), Tamil Nadu (1). Even if we assume that two-thirds of these 57 seats would have been won by the BJP contesting alone, this would still leave it 19 seats short of its present total and short of a majority. Hence, the BJP's majority in 2014 was crucially dependent on vote transfer from its pre-electoral allies, much like the CPI(M)'s majority in the West Bengal assembly in the past depended importantly on vote transfer from other Left Front allies.

Leaving aside the importance of pre-electoral coalitions, the centrality of coalition politics will remain due to the NDA's dependence on opposition parties beyond the coalition to pass legislation in the Rajya Sabha. At present, the BJP has only 43 members in the 245-seat Rajya Sabha, and just 57 with its NDA allies, well short of the halfway mark of 123. Even if one makes highly favorable assumptions for the BJP in forthcoming state assembly elections through its term, including the October 2014 elections in Maharashtra and Haryana that the BJP won, and factors in upcoming Rajya Sabha vacancies, the NDA's net gains would still make it fall short of the halfway mark for most, if not all, of its term in office.

Table 2: 2014 Results—BJP's Stronghold and Rest of India

| | Coalition/ Party | BJP's Stronghold Hindi Belt+ Gujarat+ Maharashtra+ Goa+ Dadra- Nagar Haveli,+ Chandigarh + Daman & Diu (304 seats) | | | | Rest of India (239 seats) | | | |
		Seats Contested	Seats Won	Seat %	Vote %	Seats Contested	Seats Won	Seats %	Vote %
NDA	BJP	266	244	81%	44%	161	38	16%	19%
	BJP Allies	39	29	10%	5%	75	18	8%	11%
UPA	INC	233	10	3%	20%	229	34	14%	21%
	INC Allies	65	11	5%	6%	6	4	2%	1%
	AIADMK					41	37	15%	8%
	AITC					60	34	14%	9%
	BJD					21	20	8%	4%
	Left Front					78	11	5%	10%
	Others					42		20%	44%

Notes: For party acronyms refer to Table 1.
Source: Election Commission of India http://eciresults.nic.in/PartyWiseResult.htm

The BJP's Regionally Limited Presence and the Importance of Coalition Politics Last but not least, coalition politics will remain important because the BJP's stated objective is to expand its base outward from its current strongholds in the northern and central Hindi-belt states and the three western states. For this, it will need allies in the other southern and eastern states except possibly in Karnataka and Assam. This is because the BJP's narrow majority of 52 percent of Lok Sabha seats is very disproportionately based on an unprecedented sweep in the Hindi-speaking northern and central states and Union Territories and three western states and Union Territories. Of the BJP's 282 seats, as many as 244, or 87 percent came from this Hindi-belt plus western India stronghold, or in other words, it won a whopping 81 percent of the 304 seats in this region, or an even more whopping 92 percent of the seats contested (244 out of 266 contested) in this region based on a 44 percent vote share in this region. Replicating such a strike rate in future elections would be highly improbable. The BJP itself is aware of this fact, hence its realization that an expansion into the south and east will be necessary and will require either an improbable quantum jump in vote share, or more realistically, the formation of pre-electoral coalitions with regional party allies.

For these interlocking reasons, coalition politics will remain important for governance and for the BJP's electoral strategy over its term, at the Centre and in the states. BJP President Amit Shah's recent statement in the aftermath of the heady victories in Maharashtra and Haryana that the era of coalition politics is over looks like an overstatement over the longer term.

Coalition Politics, Question of Corruption and Remedies

Finally, economic well-being of a state cannot offset the political mess that is being created and perpetuated. So what could be done to ensure right conduct of the parties?

1. Opportunistic alliances should not be encouraged and not allowed to be formed. More so, when two parties fight each other at the States level, but allied together at the Centre. This smacks of nothing but simple opportunism be it to be in office one way or the other, or keep the other "rascals" out. If they are opposed to each other at one level, there is no logic or sanctity in being allies at another. There is already a common parlance to this kind of arrangement– "unholy alliances." [12] Once the number of small and opportunistic parties is reduced, silly alliances may not even be necessary.

2. The alliances are abetted further by the thought that "today we might fight, but tomorrow we could be friends." [13] This perpetuates the unworthy alliances.

3. Joining and leaving a coalition willy nilly, not based on any ideological grounds but to suit the needs of the day, must somehow be stopped. 'When a party joins a coalition, it must be bound by whatever minimum program they agreed to. Thus, a coalition should stand or fall in its entirety'. [14]

4. The practice of giving support to a coalition without being a member of the government must be prevented. This is the worst kind of opportunism. 'If a party successfully pushes for a policy stance, then that party must also take the responsibility for governance and be held accountable. By not being a part of the government, and running a government by stealth is not democracy'. [15]

5. Proliferation of parties, however undemocratic it might sound, must be stopped. How many parties are needed for a successful working of a democracy is a debatable issue. But there does not appear to be any reason to have many fragmented, small parties, particularly those with no well defined ideological positions, and not a ghosts's chance of coming to power, and run a government. 'Many of the small parties are also organized around individual personalities, who either were thrown out, or themselves walked out when it was no more lucrative to be with a bigger party. Just notice that when a party's name is mentioned, it is the so-called leader that comes to mind, and not any philosophical position. To weed these out, it is possible to set some floor ceilings such as the requirement of a minimum number of votes in an election to continue later, or show a required strength by way of signatures of voters or a certain amount of funds in each coffer'. [16] The Election Commission (EC) has already been talking of de-recognizing those parties which are only on paper, and had not contested elections for more than five years.

Most of the above can be accomplished without touching the Constitution, and only by simple legislative measures such as amending the Peoples Representation Act and empowering the EC. But then this argument assumes that the EC itself insulated from the hurly burly of politics and certainly not brought under the control of the government in power. Again, the burden is thus on the political parties and their leaders. 'The need of the hour is a disciplined party system led by honorable and just party leaders who shall abide by the admonition of Mahatma Gandhi not to indulge in one of the seven sins– politics without principle. Otherwise, the adage that "tomorrow is another day" when all things are possible as usual will continue to operate abetting political corruption'. [17]

Is coalition politics good for India?

With the recent victory of the "Mahagathbandhan" in Bihar, analysts are saying that coalition politics in India is far from over. A coalition government forms when two/more political parties form an alliance compromising on their concerned party policy and agenda. Coalition governments have been around for a long time now. Various countries including UK, Finland and Australia have witnessed formation of coalition governments. But is a coalition good for the people?

'Coalition is made up of democratically elected representatives, but in itself, it is a way to grab power regardless of the verdict of the electorate. Coalition politics is merely a partisan grab to capitalise on a political crisis. Forming alliances is filled with challenges and each coalition member suffers from insecurities regarding the alliance. Further, citizens also cannot be sure when the coalition government will give way and leave them in a state of political anarchy'. [18] Alliance between national and regional parties has impacted the relations between the Union and the States. While regional parties give stress to their state's problems and place pressure on coalition government to provide greater attention to these, the Centre tries to balance regional interests in different states. This creates a lack of congruence in the functioning of the federal polity in India. Not one person thought about the coalition when India regained freedom and the INC was the sole ruling party. With the advent of the NDA in 1971, coalition politics in India gained momentum. Now, with the regionalisation and fragmentation of politics, coalitions have become an unstable agreement in uncertain times, where there are no political allies or enemies. It is not an alliance formed by willing parties. 'Often, the parties in the coalition are at odds with each other on even basic issues. This leads to a lot of political infighting apart from

creating political compulsions for parties to compromise on their ideals and values. Often, coalitions cause the ruling party or leading parties to form alliances with less number of seats. This enables them to grab power again and goes against the verdict of the electorate for a change'. [19] If there are too many parties controlling the fate of the people, anarchy and disorder will eventually result because no single party is in power. 'Multiple parties mean a multitude of opinions on every issue and lack of agreement on policies or their implementation. If there are more parties with a say in the matter, no Bill will be passed without lengthy debates, discussions and disruptions. The smooth functioning of the Parliament is harmed by the advent of coalition politics and this is not good for the country. Outside support is also a critical political quotient in the entire equation'. [20] If outside support is withdrawn, the ruling party will not be able to govern and political instability will be affecting the end result in terms of administrative output.

As far as benefits are concerned these are as follows; By far, the most largest advantage of coalition government at the centre is the proportionate representation of regional political parties in the LS. This ensures that they have a voice in the decisions or proceedings of the court. Coalitions represent the will of a broader section of the population thereby working as an effective tool to stave off passage of undemocratic bills which are not in the interests of the larger democracy. 'If a coalition government is in power, this means that the electorate has given a verdict which is mixed. The formation of a coalition government therefore does reflect the will of the people. This includes governments in Canada, Australia and Finland. A coalition government offers greater success for diverse communities of India to have a say in the decision making process'. [21] It is a government of the people, by the people and for the people. Votes have to be divided in the name of communities, castes and religions because India is truly a pluralistic society which values diversity. Since many of the coalition members do not share a common ideology, they engage in widespread discourse regarding policy and decision making. This reflects the true essence of democracy. The alliances of political parties represent the aspirations of people from every region and constituency, rather than a dominant majority. The voice of the minority is not stifled. India states find space within the national agenda.

'Alliances force political parties to be conscious of their public image and practice discretion within their policy making, actions and decisions. It reflects an understanding of the reality of contemporary political scenarios. Political alliances mean that parties will have to compromise on radical ideologies and approaches to make decisions which are more in the interests of the people'. [22] When diverse regional parties coalesce to form a union, they are able to concentrate on solution oriented decision making and prevent repetition of political mistakes.

Conclusion

All said and done, political parties will continue to rely on coalitions regardless of electoral verdicts. This has its advantages as well as disadvantages. In the ultimate analysis, it is the competency of the government and not whether it is a coalition or an individual party, that plays an important role in impacting the welfare of the people. Whether the right decisions come from a coalition or an individual ruling party, they will always be appreciated and rewarded by the public.

References

1. Caplow, Theodore, "Further Development of a Theory of Coalitions in the Triad",American Journal of Sociology,Vol. 64, March 1959.

2. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_alliance

3. Coalitions and political stability - of Planning Commission, planningcommission.nic.in/reports/sereport/ser/vision2025/policoltn.doc

4. Chander. Prakash. Indian Government and Politics. Cosmos Book Hive (P) Ltd, New Delhi, 1989.

5. Raj, Hans J. Indian Political System. Surjeet Publications: New Delhi. 1981.

6. Khan, M.G., "Coalition Government and federal System in India, The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 64, No. 3-4, July-December, 2003

7. Comparative Study of Coalitions", Research and Policy Planning Division of the Union Home Ministry, 1967.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. A.G. Noorani, Coalition Lessons, Frontline, Volume 29 - Issue 20 :: Oct. 06-19,2012,http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl2920/stories/20121019292008100.htm

11. Sartroi, Giovani. Partners and Party Systems. Cambridge University Press: London, 1976.

12. Krishna K Tumala, Political Corruption in India: Coalition Dharma?, International Public Management Review · electronic Journal at http://www.ipmr.net Volume 11 · Issue 2 · 2010 · http://journals.sfu.ca/ipmr/index.php/ipmr/article/viewFile/82/82

13. Ram. Sundar. ed. Coalition Politics and Search for Political Stability. National Publishing House: New Delhi, 2001.

14. Ibid.

15. Grover, Verinder. The problem of Party Government in India Political System in India. Deep and Deep Publications: New Delhi, 1989.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Schofield, Norman, "Coalition Politics and Representative Democracy" European Journal of Political Research, 31, 1997.

19. P.R. Brass, 1968. Coalition Politics in North India, American Political Science Review.

20. Ibid.

21. Weiner, Myron. Party Politics in India: The Development of a Multi-party System, (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1957.

22. Raj, Hans, Indian Government and Politics, Cosmos Publications, New Delhi, 1992.